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Abstract
We introduce new forms of attack on expander-based cryptography, and in particular on Goldreich’s
pseudorandom generator and one-way function. Our attacks exploit low circuit complexity of the
underlying expander’s neighbor function and/or of the local predicate. Our two key conceptual
contributions are:
1. We put forward the possibility that the choice of expander matters in expander-based crypto-
graphy. In particular, using expanders whose neighbour function has low circuit complexity
might compromise the security of Goldreich’s PRG and OWF in certain settings.
2. We show that the security of Goldreich’s PRG and OWF is closely related to two other long-
standing problems: Specifically, to the existence of unbalanced lossless expanders with low-
complexity neighbor function, and to limitations on circuit lower bounds (i.e., natural proofs).
In particular, our results further motivate the investigation of affine/local unbalanced lossless
expanders and of average-case lower bounds against DNF-XOR circuits.
We prove two types of technical results that support the above conceptual messages. First,
we unconditionally break Goldreich’s PRG when instantiated with a specific expander (whose
existence we prove), for a class of predicates that match the parameters of the currently-best
“hard” candidates, in the regime of quasi-polynomial stretch. Secondly, conditioned on the
existence of expanders whose neighbor functions have extremely low circuit complexity, we
present attacks on Goldreich’s generator in the regime of polynomial stretch. As one corollary,
conditioned on the existence of the foregoing expanders, we show that either the parameters of
natural properties for several constant-depth circuit classes cannot be improved, even mildly; or
Goldreich’s generator is insecure in the regime of a large polynomial stretch, regardless of the
predicate used.
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1 Introduction
Theoretical results provide strong evidence that if secure cryptography is possible, then many
fundamental primitives such as one-way functions (OWF) and pseudorandom generators
(PRG) can be implemented with a dramatic level of efficiency and parallelism. Specifically,
security against efficient adversaries can be achieved by functions where each output bit only
depends on a constant number of input bits (see, e.g., [6], and also [2] for a survey of recent
results).
A concrete type of such construction is a conjectured form of OWF that is based on any
expander graph and on a local predicate. Specifically, about two decades ago, Goldreich [16, 17]
suggested the following candidate owf : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. Fix any bipartite graph [n]× [n]
of right-degree ` ≤ O(log(n)) in which every set S ⊆ [n] of size up to k on the right-hand
side has at least (say) 1.01 · |S| neighbors, and also fix a predicate P : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}. Then,
given input x ∈ {0, 1}n, each output bit owf(x)i is computed by applying P to the bits of x
at the ` neighbors of i ∈ [n]. The expected running-time of a naive algorithm for inverting
owf is at least exp(k) (see, e.g., [17, Sec. 3.2] and [2, Sec. 3.1]), and Goldreich conjectured
that for an appropriate predicate P , no algorithm can perform significantly better.
In an extensive subsequent line of research (see, e.g., [1, 23, 4, 9, 5, 10, 14, 25, 15, 7, 8],
and also see [3] for a related survey), Goldreich’s construction was conjectured to yield not
only a one-way function, but also a pseudorandom generator prg : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m. In
fact, in some settings the two conjectures are essentially equivalent (see [8, Sec. 3]).
The question of whether Goldreich’s constructions are secure is a long-standing open
problem. Much research has focused on necessary requirements from the predicate and from
the parameters in order for the construction to be secure. Let us, for simplicity of presentation,
focus on the PRG. In this case, the locality ` cannot be too small: If we want a PRG with
super-linear stretch, then we must use ` ≥ 5 [23];1 and if we want stretch m = nk then ` must
be at least (roughly) 3k (see [25, Thm. II.11]). Also, as shown in [7], the predicate must
have high resilience (i.e., all of the predicate’s Fourier coefficients corresponding to sets of
size at most Ω(`) are zero; see [26, Def. 3.4]) and high rational degree (this is a generalization
of the requirement that the degree of the predicate as a polynomial F`2 → F2 is Ω(`); see [26,
Def. 3.7]).
The foregoing properties capture most existing attacks in the PRG setting. Indeed,
as mentioned above, all these attacks exploit vulnerabilities of the predicate and of the
parameters, but not of the underlying expander. In fact, prior to our work, the PRG
was conjectured to be secure for any underlying expander with sufficiently good expansion
properties. For reference, let us state such a strong form of conjectured security of the
OWF, from a recent work by Applebaum and Raykov [8]. We say that a bipartite graph
1 This impossibility result holds for any construction of a pseudorandom generator in NC0.
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G = ([n], [m], E) with right-degree ` is a (k, 0.99)-expander if for every set S ⊆ [m] on the
right-hand side of size at most k, the number of neighbors of S in G is at least 0.99 · ` · |S|. 2
Then, the conjecture is the following:
I Assumption 1 (the strong EOWF assumption). For a family P = {P` : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}}`∈N
of predicates, the strong EOWF (P) assumption is the following. For any (n.99, .99)-expander
G = ([n], [m], E) of right-degree ` ≤ no(1) such that n ≤ m ≤ nα·`, where α > 0 is a
sufficiently small universal constant, Goldreich’s function instantiated with G and P` cannot
be inverted by circuits of size t ≤ exp(α · n.99) with success probability 1/t.
Applebaum and Raykov [8] suggested a suitable candidate predicate, which is the predicate
XOR-MAJ(x) =
(⊕i=1,...,b`/2cxi) ⊕ (MAJ(xb`/2c+1, ..., x`)); this predicate indeed has both
high resiliency and high rational degree.
1.1 A high-level digest of our contributions
Our main contribution is a new form of attack on Goldreich’s pseudorandom generator,
which exploits computational complexity properties (and, in particular, circuit complexity
properties) of the expander and/or of the predicate on which the generator is based. In
particular, our distinguishers are algorithms associated with natural properties, in the sense
of Razborov and Rudich [28]. (Recall that a natural property against a circuit class C is
an efficient algorithm that distinguishes a random string, interpreted as a truth table, from
truth tables of C-circuits.)3
We use our new form of attack to break the generator when it is instantiated with
predicates that are sufficiently “strong” to withstand known attacks, but with expanders
whose neighbor function has “low” circuit complexity. In high-level, the main conceptual
implications of these results are the following:
1. The conjecture that the PRG and OWF are secure with any expander, given an appropriate
predicate, might be too naive. In particular, the security of the constructions might
crucially hinge on a choice of expander whose neighbor function has sufficiently high
circuit complexity. Alternatively, if the latter is not true (i.e., if the PRG and OWF
can be secure given any expander), then the predicate must have sufficiently high circuit
complexity for the constructions to be secure in some settings (i.e., when the stretch is
quasi-polynomial).
Note that a random graph will (with high probability) not only be an expander, but also
have a neighbor function with high circuit complexity. Therefore, our results do not put
into question the security of the PRG and OWF when instantiated with a random graph.
2. There are significant interdependencies between the security of Goldreich’s PRG and OWF,
the existence of unbalanced lossless expanders with low-complexity neighbor function, and
limitations on circuit lower bounds (i.e., natural proofs). Moreover (as further explained
below), the questions motivated by our results are closely related both to existing results
and to long-standing open problems in each area.
2 We stress that lossless expansion (i.e., expansion to α · ` · |S| vertices for α > 1/2) is crucial in the
PRG setting. To see this, note that one can duplicate a right-vertex in a (k, 0.99)-expander: This will
produce a graph that, on the one hand, has good (but not lossless!) expansion properties, and on the
other hand yields a corresponding PRG that is clearly insecure, regardless of the predicate.
3 Natural properties are typically used to break pseudorandom functions, but the idea of using natural
properties to break pseudorandom generators goes back to [28, Thm. 4.2]. Nevertheless, implementing
this idea in our setting presents specific new challenges; for further discussion see Section 2.4.
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Being more specific, we unconditionally break Goldreich’s generator in the setting of
quasi-polynomial stretch when it is instantiated with predicates with high resilience and
rational degree, but with an expander whose neighbor function can be computed by AC0[⊕]
circuits of (small) subexponential size. In fact, our predicates are variations on the specific
XOR-MAJ predicate mentioned above. Using a known reduction of PRGs to OWFs (by [8]), it
follows that Assumption 1 does not hold for some predicates with high resilience and rational
degree. To prove this result we actually prove the existence of expanders with neighbor
function as above; the latter proof, which uses certain unconditional PRGs that can be
computed in a strongly explicit fashion, might be of independent interest. (See Section 1.2.)
In the regime of polynomial stretch, we put forward two assumptions about plausible
extensions of known expander constructions in which the neighbor functions have even lower
circuit complexity (compared to the expander mentioned above). Conditioned on any of the
two assumptions, we show that exactly one of two options holds: Either the parameters of
natural properties for certain restricted constant-depth circuit classes cannot be improved,
even mildly; or Goldreich’s generator is insecure in the regime of a large polynomial stretch,
regardless of the predicate used. (See Section 1.3.)
Some important cryptographic applications crucially rely on the security of expander-
based PRGs with polynomial, or even linear, stretch (see, e.g., [3, Sec. 4, “The Stretch”] and
the references therein). We stress that our results for the setting of polynomial stretch are
conditional on the existence of suitable expanders, and only break the PRG and OWF if there
are natural properties for constant-depth circuit classes beyond what is currently known.
Thus, further investigation is needed to determine whether our results have implications on
the security of the aforementioned applications.
1.2 Unconditional results for quasi-polynomial stretch
Our main result for the setting of quasi-polynomial stretch is an attack that unconditionally
breaks Goldreich’s PRG when it is instantiated with a specific expander that has optimal
expansion properties, and with a class of predicates that have both high resilience and high
rational degree. Specifically:
I Theorem 2 (unconditional attack on Goldreich’s PRG with quasi-polynomial stretch; informal).
For every d ∈ N and sufficiently large k, c ∈ N there exists a deterministic polynomial-time
algorithm A that satisfies the following. Let n ∈ N be sufficiently large, let m = nlogk(n), and
let ` = c · logk(n). Then, there exists an (n0.99, 0.99)-expander G = ([n], [m], E) of right-degree
` such that for any predicate P : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} that can be computed by an AC0[⊕] circuit of
depth d and sufficiently small sub-exponential size, when Goldreich’s generator is instantiated
with the expander G and the predicate P , the algorithm A distinguishes the m-bit output of
the generator from a uniform m-bit string (with gap > 1/2).
In fact, we actually prove a more general theorem, which exhibits a trade-off between
the locality ` and the size of the AC0[⊕] circuit for the predicate P (for a precise statement
see [26, Thm. 4.6]). That is, we are able to break the generator even with much larger
locality (e.g., ` = n.01), at the expense of using a more restricted predicate family, namely
that of AC0[⊕] circuits of smaller size (e.g., polynomial size). We stress that even the latter
predicate family is rich enough to contain predicates that have both high resilience and high
rational degree (see below).
Recall that the property of the expander [n]× [m] that we exploit in our attack is that its
neighbor functions (i.e., the functions Γi : [m]→ [n] for i ∈ [`]) have low circuit complexity.
The expander in Theorem 2 in particular has neighbor functions that can be computed by
AC0[⊕] circuits of small sub-exponential size, and we prove its existence in [26, Sec. 4.1] (see
Section 2.2 for a high-level description).
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Combining Theorem 2 with Applebaum and Raykov’s reduction of expander-based PRGs
to expander-based OWFs [8, Thm. 3.1] (i.e., they prove that if an arbitrary instance
of Goldreich’s OWF is secure, then a closely-related instance of Goldreich’s PRG is also
secure), our attack also breaks Goldreich’s OWF. Specifically, we say that a predicate
P : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} is sensitive if it is “fully sensitive” to one of its coordinates (i.e., if for all
x ∈ {0, 1}` it holds that P (x) = xi ⊕ P ′(x), for some i ∈ [`] and P ′ that does not depend on
xi). Then:
I Corollary 3 (unconditional attack on Goldreich’s OWF with quasi-polynomial stretch; informal).
There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A′ that satisfies the following. Let
n ∈ N be sufficiently large, let m′ = nk′=poly log(n), and let ` = O(k′). Then, there exists an
(n0.99, 0.99)-expander G = ([n], [m′], E) of right-degree ` such that for any sensitive predicate
P : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} that can be computed by an AC0[⊕] circuit of sufficiently small sub-
exponential size, when Goldreich’s one-way function is instantiated with the expander G and
the predicate P , the algorithm A inverts the function with success probability Ω(1/m′n).
As immediate corollaries of Theorem 2 and of Corollary 3, we deduce that Assumption 1
does not hold for any sensitive predicate family that can be computed by AC0[⊕] circuits of
sufficiently small sub-exponential size; and similarly, that the “PRG analogue” of Assumption 1,
denoted EPRG(P) in [8], does not hold for any predicate family that can be computed by
AC0[⊕] circuits of sufficiently small sub-exponential size.
Recall that Applebaum and Raykov suggested the candidate predicate XOR-MAJ; we
prove that when replacing majority by approximate majority (see [26, Def. 4.9]), the resulting
predicate XOR-APPROX-MAJ still has both high resilience and high rational degree, and
can also be computed by a polynomial-sized AC0[⊕] circuit (see [26, Sec. 4.3.2]). Thus,
the predicate families in Theorem 2 and Corollary 3 contain predicates with high resilience
and high rational degree, and even predicates that are variations on the “hard” candidate
XOR-MAJ. 4
Moreover, the predicate XOR-APPROX-MAJ does not even use the “full power” of the
predicate family for which Theorem 2 allows us to break Goldreich’s generator – the predicate
XOR-APPROX-MAJ is computable by a circuit of polynomial size, whereas we can break
the generator when the predicate can be computed by a circuit of sub-exponential size. We
use this to our advantage by relying on the more general version of Theorem 2 (i.e., [26,
Thm. 4.6]), which exhibits a trade-off between locality and the predicate class. Specifically,
we obtain the following theorem, which breaks the generator even when the locality ` is large
(e.g., ` = nΩ(1)) and the predicate has high resilience and rational degree:
I Theorem 4 (breaking Goldreich’s generator with XOR-APPROX-MAJ and high locality).
There exists s > 1 such that the following holds. Let n ∈ N, let m = nk=(log(n))s , and let
c · k ≤ ` ≤ n1/c, where c is a sufficiently large constant. Then, there exists an (n0.99, 0.99)-
expander G = ([n], [m], E) of right-degree ` and a predicate P : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} with resilience
Ω(`) and rational degree Ω(`) (i.e., the predicate XOR-APPROX-MAJ) such that the following
holds: When Goldreich’s generator is instantiated with the expander G and the predicate P ,
the output of the generator can be distinguished from a uniform string (with gap > 1/2) by a
deterministic poly(m)-time algorithm.
4 Indeed, the main difference between XOR-MAJ and XOR-APPROX-MAJ seems to be in their circuit
complexity, which corresponds to our main point that circuit complexity considerations are crucial for
the security of Goldreich’s PRG and OWF.
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1.3 Conditional results for large polynomial stretch
Recall that the conjectured “hardness” of Goldreich’s PRG (i.e., Assumption 1) refers
both to the regime of polynomial stretch and to the regime of quasi-polynomial stretch
(as long as the locality is sufficiently large to support the corresponding stretch). Could
it be that complexity-based attacks separate these two parameter regimes? That is, could
the reason that our attacks from Section 1.2 work be that the stretch of the generator is
super-polynomial?
As mentioned in Section 1.1 (and will be explained in Section 2), the underlying technical
components in our complexity-based attacks are unbalanced lossless expanders [n] × [m]
whose neighbor functions have low circuit complexity, and natural properties against weak
circuit classes. Our main results for the polynomial-stretch regime are of the following form:
If lossless expanders [n]× [nO(1)] with constant degree and (specific) “very simple” neighbor
functions exist, then exactly one of two cases holds:
1. Either the parameters of natural properties for certain well-studied weak circuit classes
cannot be improved, even mildly; or
2. For a sufficiently large polynomial stretch, Goldreich’s generator is insecure when
instantiated with a specific expander, regardless of the predicate used.
We now present two plausible assumptions on existence of suitable expanders, which are
essentially improvements or extensions of existing explicit constructions. Conditioned on
each assumption, we will contrast the security of Goldreich’s PRG with the possibility of
extending natural proofs for some well-studied circuit class.
1.3.1 Affine expanders and DNF-XOR circuits
As motivation for our first assumption, let us recall two well-known explicit constructions of
unbalanced lossless expanders, which were given by Ta-Shma, Umans, and Zuckerman [30],
and later on by Guruswami, Umans, and Vadhan [19]. We note that these two constructions
are inherently different (the relevant construction from [30] is combinatorial, whereas the
construction of [19] is algebraic), and yet in both constructions the neighbor function of
the expander can be computed by single layer of parity gates (see [26, Sec. 5.1] for further
details); we will call expanders with such a neighbor function affine expanders.
In the two foregoing affine expanders, the right-degree ` is polylogarithmic, and it is an
open problem to improve the degree to be constant, which matches the degree of a random
construction. However, a random construction is not necessarily affine. Our first assumption
is that there indeed exists an affine expander with constant degree:
I Assumption 5 (expanders with an affine neighbor function; informal, see [26, Ass. 5.4]).
There exists β > 3 such that for every constant k ∈ N and sufficiently large n ∈ N, there exists
an (n.99, 0.99)-expander G = ([n], [m = nk], E) with right-degree ` = β · k whose neighbor
function ΓG : [m]→ ([n])` can be computed by a single layer of parity gates.
An unconditional proof of Assumption 5 will contrast the security of Goldreich’s PRG
with the possibility of extending the known natural properties for DNF-XOR circuits of
exponential size. 5 Specifically, known lower bounds for DNF-XOR circuits yield natural
5 Recall that DNF-XOR circuits are depth-3 circuits that consist of a top OR gate, a middle layer of AND
gates, and a bottom layer of parities above the inputs.
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properties useful against such circuits of size up to 2(1−o(1))·n (see [26, Sec. 5.1.2]).6 Can
these natural properties be extended to functions that are approximated, in the average-case
sense, by DNF-XOR circuits of size 2·n, for some  > 0? This is the natural property that
we contrast with the security of Goldreich’s PRG:
I Theorem 6 (is Goldreich’s generator insecure, or are natural properties for DNF-XOR circuits
“non-extendable”?; informal statement). Suppose that Assumption 5 holds. Then, exactly one
of the following two options holds:
1. For all  > 0, there does not exist a natural property for the class of functions that can be
approximated with success 1/2 + o(1) by DNF-XOR circuits of size 2·n.
2. For a sufficiently large k ∈ N, Goldreich’s generator is insecure with stretch m = nk and
locality ` = β · k, for some expander and regardless of the local predicate used.
We stress that for any value of β > 3 such that Assumption 5 holds, Theorem 6 follows
with that value of β. Also note that Cohen and Shinkar [13] specifically conjectured that
strong average-case lower bounds for DNF-XOR circuits of size 2Ω(n) hold, and proved a
similar statement for the related-yet-weaker model of parity decision trees. (Their proof for
parity decision trees indeed yields a natural property; see [26, Prop. 5.13].)
1.3.2 NC0 expanders and weak AC04 circuits
To motivate our next assumption, recall the recent explicit construction of lossless expanders
by Viola and Wigderson [33, Thm. 4] (which builds on the well-known construction of
Capalbo et al. [11]). In this construction the neighbor function can be computed by an
NC0 circuit, but this construction is only for balanced expanders, rather than unbalanced
ones. The following assumption is that such a construction is possible also for unbalanced
expanders:
I Assumption 7 (expanders with NC0 neighbor functions; informal, see [26, Ass. 5.19]). There
exists β > 3 such that for every constant k ∈ N and sufficiently large n ∈ N, there exists an
(n.99, 0.99)-expander G = ([n], [m = nk], E) with right-degree ` = β · k such that the neighbor
function ΓG : [m]→ ([n])` can be computed by an NC0 circuit.
An unconditional proof of Assumption 7 will immediately break Goldreich’s PRG in the
polynomial-stretch regime by a complexity-based attack, when instantiated with a weak (but
non-trivial) predicate class; see [26, Prop. 5.25]. But more importantly, such a proof will
contrast the security of Goldreich’s PRG with the possibility of extending the known natural
properties for the class of exponential-sized AC0 circuits of depth four with constant bottom
fan-in and top fan-in.
Since the precise trade-off between the parameters is a bit subtle, let us present the
theorem in a simplified form (for a discussion of the more general setting, see [26, Sec. 5.2],
and in particular [26, Sec. 5.2.3]). To do so, consider the (optimistic) possibility that in
Assumption 7, there exists a single t such for any k ∈ N the arity of the NC0 circuit is t (i.e.,
each output bit of the circuit is a function of at most t input bits, where t does not depend
on k); as far as we are aware of, such a hypothesis is possible even with t = 1. Relying on
Håstad’s switching lemma [21], for any c = O(1) there exists a natural property against
depth-four circuits with top fan-in c, bottom fan-in t, and size 2·(n/ log(c)) for a tiny universal
6 Some of these natural properties actually run in slightly super-polynomial time, rather than in strictly
polynomial time, but this issue is not crucial for our purpose of breaking Goldreich’s PRG.
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 > 0 (see [26, Cor. 5.24]). In the following theorem, the security of Goldreich’s PRG is
contrasted with the possibility of extending these natural properties to work against such
circuits of size 2β·(n/ log(c)) where β > 3.
I Theorem 8 (is Goldreich’s generator insecure, or are natural properties for very restricted AC0
circuits “non-extendable”?; informal statement). Suppose that Assumption 7 holds and that for
any k ∈ N, the arity of the NC0 circuit equals t = O(1). Then, exactly one of the following
two options holds:
1. For any c ∈ N, there does not exist a natural property for depth-four AC0 circuits with
top fan-in c and bottom fan-in t and size O
(
2β·(n/ log(c))
)
.
2. For a sufficiently large k ∈ N, Goldreich’s generator is insecure with stretch m = nk and
predicate locality ` = β · k, for some expander and regardless of the predicate used.
Recall that Assumption 7 is parametrized by β and by the arity of the NC0 circuit; we
stress that for any values of β and t such that Assumption 7 holds, we get a corresponding
“win-win” theorem such as Theorem 8 (for further details see [26, Sec. 5.2]). We also stress
that both the natural properties that we can unconditionally prove and the natural properties
referred to in Theorem 8 are for circuits of exponential size 2Θ(n/ log(c)), and the difference is
in the universal constant hidden in the Θ-notation.
As mentioned in Section 1.1, the explicit construction of highly unbalanced lossless
expanders is a long-standing open problem, regardless of the circuit complexity of their
neighbor function (see, e.g., [11], [32, Prob. 5.36 & 6.35], and [34, Chap. 8.7]). Assumptions 5
and 7, however, do not concern explicit constructions of expanders, but only assume their
existence; in particular, the circuit family for the neighbor function of the graph may be non-
uniform. (This is indeed the case for our construction of expanders in the quasi-polynomial
stretch regime.)
2 Overviews of the proofs
2.1 The general form of attack
A natural property for a class F of functions is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm
that rejects all truth-tables of functions from F , but accepts the truth-tables of almost all
functions.7 Indeed, a natural property for F exists only if almost all functions are not in F .
We will show how to use natural properties to break Goldreich’s pseudorandom generator.
The key step in our proofs is to show, for every fixed x ∈ {0, 1}n, that prg(x) is the truth-
table of a function from some class F of “simple” functions (e.g., prg(x) is the truth-table
of a small constant-depth circuit). When we are able to show this, it follows that a natural
property for F can distinguish the outputs of the PRG from uniformly-chosen random strings:
This is because the natural property rejects any string in the output-set of the PRG (which
is the truth-table of a function in F), but accepts a random string, with high probability.
(The general idea of using natural properties to break PRGs in this manner goes back to the
original work of [28].)
Recall that Goldreich’s PRG (i.e., the function prg) is always a very “simple” function,
since each output bit depends on a few (i.e., ` n) input bits. However, in order for our
idea to work, we need that a different function (i.e., not the function prg) will be simple:
7 Throughout the paper, we identify a natural property with the “constructive” algorithm that recognizes
the property (see [26, Def. 3.8].
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Specifically, for every fixed input x, we want that the function gx : {0, 1}log(m) → {0, 1} such
that gx(i) = prg(x)i will be “simple”. That is, for a fixed “seed” x for the PRG, the function
gx gets as input an index i of an output bit, and computes the ith output bit of prg(x) as
a function of i. Intuitively, given i ∈ [m], the function gx needs to compute three different
objects, successively:
The neighbors ΓG(i) of the vertex i ∈ [m] in G.
The projections of the (fixed) string x on locations ΓG(i).
The output of the predicate P on xΓG(i).
The proofs of our main theorems consist of showing instantiations of Goldreich’s generator
(i.e., choices for an expander and a predicate) such that gx is a function from a class against
which we can construct natural properties.
An alternative view of the construction of gx above is as giving rise to a collection of
pseudorandom functions (PRFs)
{
gx : {0, 1}log(m) → {0, 1}
}
x∈{0,1}n that are based on (an
instantiation of) Goldreich’s PRG. In fact, the construction of gx is technically reminiscent
of constructions of PRFs that are based on Goldreich’s PRG by Applebaum and Raykov [8].
However, the crucial point is that our transformation of Goldreich’s PRG to a PRF incurs
very little complexity overhead; in particular, the circuit complexity of gx is essentially
determined by the circuit complexity of the expander’s neighbor function and of the predicate.
For further discussion see Section 2.4.
2.2 The setting of quasi-polynomial stretch
The proof of Theorem 2 consists of showing that for a suitable expander G, and for any
predicate P computable by an AC0[⊕] circuit of sufficiently small sub-exponential size, the
function gx can be computed by an AC0[⊕] circuit of sufficiently small sub-exponential
size. Natural properties for such circuits, based on the lower bounds by Razborov and
Smolensky [27, 29], are well-known (see, e.g., [28, 12]).
To describe the instantiations and the construction of an AC0[⊕] circuit for gx, let n ∈ N,
and let m = 2(log(n))k , for a sufficiently large k. The first technical component that we need is
an expander graph G such that the function i 7→ ΓG(i) can be computed by a sub-exponential
sized AC0[⊕] circuit. We show that there exists such a graph, with essentially optimal
parameters:
I Theorem 9 (strongly-explicit lossless expander in AC0[p]; see [26], Thm. 4.5). There exists a
universal constant dG ∈ N such that the following holds. For any k ∈ N and sufficiently large
n and m = 2(log(n))k , there exists a (n0.99, 0.99)-expander G = ([n], [m], E) of right-degree
` = O(log(m)/ log(n)), and an AC0[⊕] circuit CG : {0, 1}log(m) → {0, 1}`·log(n) of depth dG
and size poly(n) such that for every i ∈ [m] it holds that CG(i) outputs the list of ` neighbors
of i in G.
We stress that the depth dG of the circuit in Theorem 9 does not depend on the relation
between m and n, which is what will allow us to have a natural property for the circuit CG.
Specifically, recall that we have natural properties against AC0[⊕] circuits of depth dG over
`m = log(m) input bits of sub-exponential size 2Ω(`
1/2dG
m ). The size of CG is poly(n), and
thus if we take m = 2(log(n))k , for a sufficiently large k, then the size of CG is a sufficiently
small sub-exponent in its input length log(m).
In high-level, our construction of the expander in Theorem 9 is as follows. Our starting
point is the well-known fact that a random graph is, with high probability, a good lossless
bipartite expander (see, e.g., [26, Thm. 3.2]). The first step is to construct an efficient
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test that gets as input a string G ∈ {0, 1}m′ , where m′ = m · ` · log(n), considers G as the
incidence-list of a graph, and decides whether or not G is an (n.99, .99)-expander. We show
that such a test can be implemented by a CNF of size 2n (see [26, Clm. 4.2]). Hence, a
pseudorandom generator for CNFs of size 2n outputs, with high probability, a good expander.
Specifically, we will use the pseudorandom generator of Nisan [24], which has seed length
poly(n). Thus, for some fixed “good” seed s, the output NW (s) ∈ {0, 1}m′ of the generator
on s is an (n.99, .99)-expander.
Our next step is to show that the expander represented by NW (s) has neighbor functions
that can be computed by an AC0[⊕] circuit. In fact, we will show that there exists a circuit
that gets as input the index i ∈ {0, 1}log(m′) of a bit in NW (s) and outputs NW (s)i. To do
so we can rely, for instance, on the recent work of Carmosino et al. [12] , who showed that
Nisan’s generator can be made “strongly-explicit”: That is, there exists an AC0[⊕] circuit of
polynomial size that gets as input a seed z and an index i of an output bit, and computes the
ith output bit of the generator on seed z. 8 By “hard-wiring” a “good” seed s into the latter
circuit, we obtain an AC0[⊕] circuit of size poly(n) that computes the output bits of the
expander NW (s). Indeed, a crucial point is that we did not algorithmically look for a good
seed s, but rather non-uniformly fixed a “good” seed and “hard-wired” it into the circuit.
Given this expander construction, gx can compute i 7→ ΓG(i) in sub-exponential size, and
we now need gx to compute the projections of x on locations ΓG(i). To do so we simply
“hard-wire” the entire string x into gx. Specifically, after computing the function i 7→ ΓG(i),
the circuit now has the ` · log(n) bits of ΓG(i); it then uses ` depth-two formulas, each over
log(n) bits and of size n, to compute the mapping ΓG(i) 7→ xΓG(i) by brute-force. This
increases the size of the circuit for gx by ` · n < n2 gates, which is minor compared to the
size poly(n) of CG from Theorem 9.
Finally, the circuit gx has now computed the ` bits corresponding to xΓG(i), and needs
to compute the predicate P : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} on these bits. To get the circuit to be of
sufficiently small sub-exponential size, we require that the predicate can be computed by
a sufficiently small sub-exponential sized AC0[⊕] circuit. Specifically, we want that for
some dP , the predicate P can be computed by an AC0[⊕] circuit of depth dP and size 2` ,
for a sufficiently small  < 1/2(dG + dP + 2). We thus obtain a circuit for gx of depth
d = dG + dP + 2 and of size O
(
2`
)
< 2log(m)1/2d , 9 which is sufficiently small such that we
have natural properties against it (for a formal statement of the parameters of this well-known
natural property, proved by [28, 12], see e.g. [26, Thm. 3.9]).
2.3 The setting of large polynomial stretch
Why are the results in Section 2.2 applicable only to the setting of quasi-polynomial stretch?
The main bottleneck is the expander construction in Theorem 9, which is an AC0[⊕] circuit.
Specifically, since we only know of natural properties against AC0[⊕] circuits of at most
sub-exponential size, and since the circuit that we obtain is of size at least n (because we
hard-wire x ∈ {0, 1}n to the circuit), we were forced to take m = npoly log(n) such that n will
be a small sub-exponential function of log(m).
In this section we circumvent this obstacle by using the hypothesized existence of expanders
whose neighbor functions have “extremely simple” circuits. For simplicity, in the current
high-level overview we present the attacks that are based on the existence of an expander
8 A similar observation has appeared in other works, such as in [28, Thm. 4.2].
9 For this calculation we assumed that 2`

dominates the size of the circuit (since the size of CG is already
sufficiently small); and we used the fact that ` = O(log(m)/ log(n)) < log(m), and that  < 1/2d is
sufficiently small).
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as in Assumption 5; that is, a lossless expander G = ([n], [m = nk], E) of right-degree
` = O(k) whose neighbor function is an affine function (i.e., each output bit is a parity of
input bits). The ideas that underlie the attacks that are based on expanders whose neighbor
function is an NC0 circuit (as in Assumption 7) are similar, yet require a slightly more subtle
parametrization (see [26, Sec. 5.2]).
Consider an instantiation of Goldreich’s predicate with expander G as above and with a
predicate P : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} that can be computed by a CNF of size 2δ·`, where δ can be
an arbitrarily large constant compared to k (or even δ = 1, which allows for any predicate).
In this case, for any x ∈ {0, 1}n, the output prg(x) of the generator on x is a truth-table
of a function gx over an input i ∈ {0, 1}log(m) that can be computed as follows. One layer
of parity gates maps i ∈ [m] to ΓG(i) ∈ {0, 1}`·log(n) (this uses our assumption about the
expander). Then, ` copies of a DNF over log(n) bits and of size n map the names of the `
vertices to xΓG(i) ∈ {0, 1}`, i.e., we project the bits of x that feed the predicate P (this DNF
is essentially a “hard-wiring” of x into gx). Finally, the CNF that computes P of size 2δ·`
maps xΓG(i) to the value P (xΓG(i)). After collapsing a layer that connects the top CNF
and the DNFs, we obtain an AND-OR-AND-XOR circuit gx over `m = log(m) input bits of
size O
(
` · log(n) + ` · n+ 2`·δ) = O(2`m/k) with top fan-in 2δ·` = 2O(δ·k).
When δ > 0 is sufficiently small, we are able to unconditionally construct a natural
property against circuits as above. However, the main point (i.e., Theorem 6) comes when
considering the case δ = 1; that is, any predicate P : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}. In this case, we first
use the discriminator lemma of [20] to deduce that gx can be (1/2 + 1/2O(k))-approximated
by a DNF-XOR circuit of size O
(
2`m/k
)
. Now (still under Assumption 5), exactly one of
two options holds. The first option is that there exists a natural property for functions on
`m input bits that can be (1/2 + o(1))-approximated by DNF-XOR circuits of size 2Ω(`m);
in this case, by taking k sufficiently large so that 2`m/k is sufficiently small, the natural
property breaks the generator. The other option is that no such natural property exists,
despite the fact that natural properties exist both for functions computed (in the worst-case)
by DNF-XOR circuits of size 2(1−o(1))·`m , and for functions approximated (even weakly) by
parity decision trees of such size. This completes the sketch of the proof of Theorem 6.
2.4 The connection to expander-based pseudorandom functions
As mentioned in Section 2.1, our construction of the function gx : {0, 1}log(m) → {0, 1} (i.e.,
gx(i) = P (xΓG(i))) can be viewed as a construction of a collection of pseudorandom functions
(PRFs)
{
gx : {0, 1}log(m) → {0, 1}
}
x∈{0,1}n based on (an instantiation of) Goldreich’s PRG.
The crucial point in our transformation of Goldreich’s PRG to a PRF is that the resulting
PRF can have very low circuit complexity, depending essentially only on the complexity
of the expander’s neighbor function and of the predicate. In contrast, previously-known
transformations of Goldreich’s PRG to a PRF incur a significant overhead. Specifically, the
transformation of Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali [18] yields a circuit with super-constant
depth; whereas the constructions of Applebaum and Raykov [8] either yield only a weak PRF
(which is not broken by natural properties, in general) or require complicated computations,
which they implement using majority gates (i.e., the resulting function is in the class T C0,
for which natural properties are neither known nor conjectured to exist).
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Applebaum,10 a transformation of Goldreich’s PRG to a
weak PRF from [8] can be used to break the PRG when it is intantiated with a random graph
and with a predicate with sufficiently low circuit complexity; this attack uses algorithms for
10Personal communication.
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learning from random examples (instead of natural properties). Specifically, assume that
Goldreich’s PRG is secure when instantiated with a random graph [n]× [m] of right-degree
` and a predicate P : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}. Using the argument that appears in [8, Sec. 1.2.1]
it follows that the function gx : {0, 1}`·log(n) → {0, 1} that considers its input as a set S
of ` vertices in [n], and outputs gx(S) = P (xS), is a weak PRF against adversaries that
make m (uniformly-chosen) queries. The complexity of gx is essentially determined by the
complexity of the predicate P .11 Thus, if the latter is sufficiently small such that there
exists an algorithm for learning gx from m− 1 random examples, then gx cannot be a weak
PRF for adversaries that make m queries (since such an adversary can use the learning
algorithm to predict the mth evaluation of the function at a random point, using the first
m− 1 evaluations at random points). This contradicts the hypothesis that Goldreich’s PRG
is secure when instantiated with the predicate P and a random graph [n]× [m].
Loosely speaking, the argument above implies that Goldreich’s PRG is not secure when
the stretch is quasipolynomial (and the locality is polylogarithmic and sufficiently large),
the graph is random, and the predicate is computable by an AC0 circuit of sufficiently small
sub-exponential size; this relies on the learning algorithm of Linial, Mansour, and Nisan [22].12
However, the latter class of predicates is much weaker than the class of predicates to which
our main unconditional result applies (i.e., than the class of AC0[⊕] circuits of sufficiently
small sub-exponential size, from Theorem 2). For example, such predicates have “low”
resilience o(`), because the Fourier weight of depth-d AC0 circuits over ` bits of size 2`
is .01-concentrated on sets of size at most O(`·(d−1)) = o(`) (see [22, 31]); therefore, such
predicates do not withstand the attacks from [7]. Finally, recall that it is currently an open
problem to understand the learnability of AC0[⊕] circuits from random examples.
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